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LOBBYING THE SUPREME COURT-AN APPRAISAL
OF "POLITICAL SCIENCE FOLKLORE"
NATHAN HAKMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
][N traditional legal theory, Supreme Court cases arise accidentally, and
judicial holdings emerge from the fortuitous circumstances of private
and governmental litigation. Political scientists and other writers, on the
other hand, have embraced in varying degrees a view that the adversary
theory of the law is largely a myth. This author has himself entertained
this belief without being clear about the suppositions which support it.
After investigating the Supreme Court litigation process, this belief has
been seriously shaken.
Two basic kinds of empirical research support a "political" view of
Supreme Court action. Both approaches rely upon behavioral data and
eschew, or at least minimize, the relevance of legal doctrine and procedure.
In one approach judges are perceived as political actors and behavior
is observed within psychological or sociological "models" or "systems."
For example, the United States Supreme Court, stripped of its surrounding
legal paraphernalia, is sometimes conceptualized as a small social group.
Members of this group are observed behaving in relationships of power,
bargaining, and leadership.' Other psychological models are created to
analyze judicial opinions in terms of their "stimuli and responses,"
"votes," "attitudes," "values," or "strategies."' The evidence gathered
in some of these highly technical inquiries is supposed to provide con-
vincing demonstration that judges, like other human beings, respond to
stimuli other than legal norms, and that their public acts follow "laws"
of psychology at least as often as they do the law of stare decisis.3
* Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Binghamton.
1. E.g., Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1565 (1966).
2. A current symposium on this subject contains several articles which attempt to
construct such models. Symposium-Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79
Harv. L. Rev. 1551 (1966). One method even goes so far as to assign relative values to
the factors influencing judicial decisions. Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial
Decisions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1583 (1966).
3. Professor Glendon Schubert of Michigan State University is a leading pioneer and
scholar in a field of study known as jurimetrics or polimetrics. His two major collections
contain a comprehensive sampling of the work in this field. Schubert, Judicial Behavior
(1964); Schubert, judicial Decision-Making (1963). In the former book, Schubert attempts
to fit this kind of work into the main body of political science and jurisprudential literature.
An earlier book brings together his attempts to use various tools developed by social
psychologists and workers in other social science disciplines, e.g., factor analysis, game
theory, scalogram analysis, etc. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of judicial Behavior (1961).
Less technical writings make use of models and other conceptual apparatuses. E.g, Danelski,
15
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One must sympathize with and admire this new generation of writers
who seek and find "hard data" by the use of narrowly circumscribed
abstract frameworks and ingenious measuring instruments. However,
"political" knowledge of this type is usually confined to the study of
judges as actors. Judicial realists have long suspected that judicial
holdings are derived from inarticulate premises or socially developed value
orientations. If political scientists can demonstrate the validity of their
unique suppositions along these lines, they will have produced a remark-
able advance in our knowledge of judicial behavior.
To many of us, however, there are other perhaps more important
challenges to a political understanding of judicial processes. The political
process approach attempts to put litigation and constitutional law into
the mainstream of political life. Instead of focusing exclusively on
Supreme Court justices and their opinions, an effort is made to tie in
other relevant social action. A litigation, wherever and whenever possible,
is related to the activities of litigants, their supporters, and ultimately
to "attentive publics" arrayed on all sides of a litigation controversy. The
present essay contributes to this kind of "political" inquiry.
The "natural history" stage of this kind of research is illustrated by the
collections of case histories and depth studies carried out and collected
by Professor Alan Westin and others.4 However, Professor Glendon
Schubert correctly observed that most of this work has been simply
empirical and there has been no particular emphasis upon theory beyond
the elementary notion that it might be interesting to investigate the
activities of organized groups seeking to influence the judicial process.,
It is true, of course, that findings from these case studies, and other
similar reports, have not been the result of explicit abstract models and
theories. Nevertheless, political scientists and others who work in this
way do generalize, and their writings have resulted in a body of proposi-
A Supreme Court Justice Is Appointed (1964); Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy
(1964). For more modest efforts to apply simple statistical techniques, see Nagel, Testing
Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 Western
Political Q. 425 (1962); Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities, 24 J. Politics 92
(1962); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. Pol. Sd. Rev. 843
(1961). Other leading workers in this field include Sidney Ulmer, Joseph Tanenhaus and Fred
Kort. See Schubert, Judicial Decision-Making (1963), for samples of their work.
4. E.g., Barker & Barker, Freedoms, Courts, Politics: Studies in Civil Liberties (1965);
Prettyman, Death and the Supreme Court (1961); Pritchett & Westin, The Third Branch
of Government-8 Cases in Constitutional Politics (1963); McKean, The Integrated Bar
(1963); Tresolini, Justice and the Supreme Court (1963); Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates;
A Study in Power Politics (1963). For indications of other research in this field, see
Schubert, Behavioral Research in Public Law, 57 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 433 (1963).
5. Schubert, supra note 4.
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tions less rigorous but similar to a theory of judicial politics. This "theory"
relies heavily on a study of "lobbies," "pressure groups," and "potential
groups" contributing to the process of litigation. The underlying assump-
tion is that courts, like legislatures and administrative agencies, are
political institutions in which managed influence is brought to bear on
political choice.6
By one definition judicial holdings are political because they have
characteristics similar to other political decisions-such as their legitimacy
and their binding effect on all members of society. Though it does not
necessarily follow, it is also assumed that political decisions in the
judicial process are reached in a manner similar to that which obtains
in other political arenas. Differences in form and technique are allowed,
but all political activity is assumed to have basic ingredients of group
pressure.
Still another authoritative view holds that "private" decisions become
"political" only when groups or important segments of the "public"
become involved in a particular decision-making process. This explains
why so many persons, including lawyers, spend much of their time trying
to keep certain decisions "out of politics."8
6. Literature emphasizing this "process" approach is growing. E.g, Jacob, Justice in
America (1965); Krislov, The Supreme Court in the Political Process (1965); Peltason,
Federal Courts in the Political Process (1955); Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure
Group Activity, 319 Annals 20 (1958). Legal scholars and writers sometimes employ a
similar approach in analyzing the judicial process. E.g., H. Jones, The Courts, the Public
and the Law Explosion (1965); Ginger, Litigation as a Form of Political Action, 9 Wayne
L. Rev. 458 (1963). While legal writers and scholars do not carry around the same kind of
conceptual luggage as the political scientist, many of them seem to be observing and
generalizing about the same phenomena in the judicial process.
7. David Easton defines politics as the "authoritative allocations of values in a society."
By "authoritative" he means that the decisions have legitimacy and are binding on all
members of society. "Legitimacy" presumably refers to a "feeling" on the part of the
constituency that they ought to obey. Easton, The Political System (1953).
'Tolitical behavior" is assumed to exist, and such behavior manifested in different
political contexts can be assumed to have at least some common characteristics. Many
political scientists believe that there is a unique kind of social behavior called "political,"
though its central characteristics have thus far escaped systematic demonstration. For
example, persons who identify with larger causes, participate in demonstrations, vote
for political officers, contribute money to causes, or perform similar acts can be identified
as political actors.
8. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realistic View of Democracy in Amer-
ica (1960). In chapters I and II he discusses the ingredients of a "political" as distinguished
from a "private" conflict. It is important to note, however, that Schattschneider demonstrates
that organized groups or "lobbies" play a marginal role in the political process. The
political process he studied was the electoral process. His general thesis, however, seems
applicable to other phases of the political process.
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This essay will examine some of the leading propositions which build
upon this political "theory," particularly as they describe the activities
of litigating parties, supporters, and attentive publics in Supreme Court
proceedings, and then evaluate these notions in the light of evidence
emerging from the author's investigations of some Supreme Court cases.
Since many of these assertions now qualify merely as "assumptions" or
"working hypotheses" a reappraisal of them in the light of these findings
may put them in sharper perspective.
A Theory of the Judicial Lobby
Lobbying in judicial affairs refers to the organization and manage-
ment of influence by persons and groups who are not necessarily the
principals in a litigation. These parties differ from the ordinary litigant
in terms of their interest in developing long range policy rather than
merely winning a given case.
While lobbying or pressure in the judicial process is believed to be
widespread, writers are usually careful to note important differences in
the ways lobbyists behave in the judicial and legislative arenasY Judges
are ordinarily not contacted directly, correspondence is definitely dis-
couraged, and picketing, demonstrations, and even milder forms of out-
side pressure seldom accompany pending cases. All forms of persuasion
are pursued with a maximum regard for judicial dignity and protocol.
The tactics of judicial lobbying are assumed to be of a different order,
and they are frequently listed as follows: (1) the "class action" replacing
individual litigants; (2) the test case; (3) amicus curiae participation;
(4) the granting by an outsider (usually an organization) of advice,
information, and service; (5) the providing of expert testimony and
research assistance by a non-principal; (6) the granting of financial
assistance by a non-principal; (7) the outsider assuming control of a
litigation.
Besides describing these techniques, commentators on Supreme Court
litigation also describe the use of other strategies and tactics. These
include: (1) bringing alternative litigations in different judicial forums;
9. Lobbying should be distinguished from barratry, the persistent incitement of litigation,
and champerty, the support of litigation purely for monetary gain. See NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963). Barratry would be considered private until public sanctions are
imposed. Champerty is presumably "political" but outside the range of the present inquiry.
For discussions of lobbying in the judicial process, see Beth, Politics, the Constitution
and the Supreme Court (1962); Scigliano, The Courts; A Reader in the Judicial Process
176-77 (1962); Hakman, Business Influence in the Judicial Process, 1 Western Bus. Rev.
124 (1957); Robison, Organizations Promoting Civil Rights and Liberties, 275 Annals
18 (1951).
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(2) "broadening the issues" through research and publication; (3)
engaging in other kinds of litigation planning.
In the published literature the bringing of alternative litigations is
reported to be used to achieve the following objectives: (1) achieving
the most favorable forum; (2) emphasizing issues differently in different
courts; (3) taking advantage of the differences in procedure and rulings
in state and federal courts; (4) dropping or compromising cases with
unfavorable records; (5) stalling some cases, and pushing others to ensure
that the "good ones" reach the Supreme Court first; (6) creating conflicts
among courts in order to encourage assumption of jurisdiction by the
Supreme Court. 0
According to this kind of political folklore the judicial lobbyist rein-
forces conventional legal argument by broadening the issues through a
"Brandeis" or "sociological" brief, or includes policy arguments in his
briefs or oral presentations. Participants in Supreme Court cases are
expected to secure the help of research organizations and similar groups
in presenting new social theories before the highest court. Since courts do
not decide cases in a vacuum, a large dose of planned publicity is some-
times deemed desirable. This publicity is occasionally secured by "flood-
ing" law reviews with articles presenting an interest group's general point
of view. 1 In consequence of this and other complex litigation tasks, it is
also assumed that the planning of Supreme Court litigation is too great
a task for the "small" or moderate-sized law firm. Success in the Supreme
Court, it is argued, "is no longer the result of a fortuitous series of
10. For detailed illustrations of litigation strategy and tactics reported to have been used
in Supreme Court cases, see Peltason, op. cit. supra note 6, at 43-54; Zeigler, Interest
Groups in American Society 315-26 (1964). Zeigler's illustrations rely heavily upon the
work of Will Maslow and Clement E. Vose. Vose, supra note 6; Maslow, In the Defense of
Religious Liberty-The Strategy and Tactics of the American Jewish Congress, paper
presented before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
September 6-9, 1961; see also Murphy & Pritchett, Courts, Judges and Politics (1961).
Clement Vose studied closely the litigation work of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.
The "political" litigation activity discussed above can, perhaps, be distinguished from
"multiple," "repetitive" and "reactive" litigation which are used by private parties for
harassment and other technically "private" purposes. Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 Iowa
L. Rev. 11 (1961); Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 525 (1960).
11. Vose discusses the flooding of law reviews by the NAACP and other organizations.
Vose, Caucasians Only (1959); Vose, supra note 6. Although Vose and other writers point
out that many of these articles were produced independently, the stress he places upon
coordinating conferences and similar activities suggests a more or less concerted effort. The
influential effect of law reviews is, of course, a separate matter. A sobering appraisal of their
effect upon Supreme Court decisions is presented in Newland, Legal Periodicals and the
United States Supreme Court, 3 Midwest J. Political Science 58 (1959).
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accidents. ' 12 Instead "groups plan their forays into litigation just as
meticulously as they do in other political areas."'8
As a result of these strategies and tactics some students of the Court
believe that its selection of cases through its certiorari jurisdiction
can be explained as the consequence of political activities. Though the
rules provide that only "important" cases and those involving conflicting
opinions among lower courts are to be given priority, political scientists
have found a statistical partiality toward "business" and "civil rights"
cases.14 Thus, among academic political scientists and others, judicial
rationales and the explanations given for the choice of cases are
minimized in favor of "deeper" political explanations.
One widespread explanation holds that "importance" arises not in the
legal or philosophical significance of a case but in terms of its "group
interests." Thus, a case is assumed to be important because it affects a
number of attentive publics. This hypothesis is difficult to examine be-
cause it is not clear whether the interests affected include parties
immediately affected by the case holding, parties in pending litigations,
organized interest groups or potential interests in the general public.
If Supreme Court cases are assumed to involve broad social interests,
then it is easy to understand why some writers emphasize the importance
of organizations among the affected group interests. Though little empiri-
cal information about organizational influence is available, political sci-
entists would probably agree that "organizations support legal action
because individuals lack the necessary time, money, and skill"',, and that
the high cost of litigation and the required bureaucratic sophistication
12. Krislov, op. cit. supra note 6; Vose, op. cit. supra note 11; Vose, supra note 6. The
organizational or bureaucratic conduct of Supreme Court litigation is accepted by some
political scientists as a fact of political life. At least one legal commentator, however, does
not see organizations as highly significant in the process of Supreme Court litigation.
Hazard, After the Trial Court-The Realities of Appellate Review, in H. Jones, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 62. Hazard asserts that organizational litigation is still comparatively
exceptional.
13. Murphy & Pritchett, op. cit. supra note 10, at 275.
14. Tanenbaus, The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in Schubert,
Judicial Decision-Making 114-17 (1963). The author reviews other explanations but finds
them unacceptable because they have not been made "operational" and amenable to
scientific (statistical) tests. Some of these explanations are as follows: (1) a large number
of persons is affected by the decision; (2) a substantial amount of related litigation is
pending or anticipated; (3) the decision below is incorrect and unjust; (4) a severe
penalty is involved; (5) the adequacy of court records (criminal cases); (6) preference
for federal as opposed to state courts; (7) a dissent by a respected judge in a lower court;
(8) a "highly rated" or prestigious set of attorneys prepared the case; (9) a policy interest
of four judges is involved; (10) the lower court opinion was rendered by a divided court.
From a behavioral point of view, support for these explanations must be derived from
demonstrations beyond the explanations given by the judges themselves.
15. Vose, op. cit. supra note 6, at 22.
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cause individual litigations to give way to the representational type.'
Academic writers are probably comfortable with a "representational" view
of judicial proceedings because it socializes proceedings which are other-
wise explained by technical legal rules.
Other by-products of this political view of litigation are the inferences
drawn from the allegedly high costs of conducting litigation. Political
scientists are not alone in believing that "cases involving small amounts
of money rarely get to the Supreme Court even though important prin-
ciples of law are involved."' 7 There is little doubt that Supreme Court
litigation, or any other litigation, is regarded as expensive. In cases with
substantial records, printing costs alone can run into the thousands of
dollars, and when other costs are added the total cost can reach exor-
bitant levels. Legal costs in important antitrust and public utility regula-
tion cases have been reported to be in the millions of dollars. However,
in commercial cases one would expect that the parties litigate only when
they have money or a good possibility of getting it by winning the case.
In any event cost figures tend to be misleading. High litigation costs may
be a by-product of continuing litigations that go back and forth in the
courts. These cases are not the equivalent of those requiring only one
trip to Washington. Also, breakdowns of litigation costs have never been
made available. There is little doubt that house counsel, retained
counsel and consulting counsel perform a variety of tasks which have
different price tags. Also costs vary with the complexity of the issues, the
size and composition of transcripts and briefs, witness fees, and other
accoutrements of litigation. F. Bernays Wiener, an experienced Supreme
Court attorney, has made more sobering estimates, but the assumed
connection between high costs and the kinds of cases receiving Supreme
Court review is by no means established.'
16. Murphy & Pritchett, op. cit. supra note 10, at 274.
17. H. Jones, op. cit. supra note 6, at 67. Professor Jones noted that government agencies
appeal cases raising issues of general interest even though such cases may be individually
inconsequential. He also suggested that private action groups like the ACLU or the NAACP
also push litigation of this kind, although such cases are relatively rare. The present
investigation produced empirical evidence supporting this view, but no conclusive information
is available regarding the costs of litigation, and some evidence was found indicating that
Supreme Court litigation is occasionally available without cost or on an economical basis.
18. The cost of Supreme Court litigation is largely an unexplored subject. However,
political science literature, especially that supplied to undergraduates, is replete with
unverified and undocumented gossip. E.g., Barker & Barker, op. cit supra note 4; Krislov,
op. cit. supra note 6; Westin, The Uses of Power 160-63 (1962); Wiener, The Conduct of
an American Appeal, 46 A.B.AJ. 829-34 (1960). The following examples give some
indication of the type of information currently available to professional political scientists
on the subject of these costs:
a. commercial cases. Westin reports that duPont is estimated to have spent $20 minion
resisting the divestiture of its General Motors stock. Westin, op. cit. supra, at 161. In
1966]
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Though the connection between litigation costs, the parties and the
subject matter of the litigation is in the realm of terra incognita, academics
have not hesitated to further assume that the parties represented in
Supreme Court cases are frequently not the "real" antagonists. In its
extreme form this view is stated as follows: "The individual (or private
another case, which went no further than the district court, it is reported that senior counsel
drew $1,000 per day and that junior associates drew $500 to $750. Total costs were estimated
at between $2 and $3 million. Ibid. Wiener states that a bill of $12,500 for printing of the
record in a regulatory case is "about par for the course." Wiener, supra at 833. He then
discusses counsel fees and concludes that a "rural" lawyer usually charges about $500 to
take an appeal to the Supreme Court while the fees of "big city" attorneys range anywhere
from $1,150 to $3,500 and in exceptional cases are in five figures. He reports that the
highest fee paid for a single argument was the $100,000 to $125,000 paid to the lawyers In
the 1952 steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Wiener, supra at 833; see Note, Small Business Before the Federal Trade Commission, 75
Yale L.J. 487, 500 n.70 (1966) (costs estimated to range from an average of $175,000 into
the millions).
b. criminal cases. Wiener reports that when a record was drastically compressed so as
to present only practical issues the printing cost was $2,750. Wiener, supra at 833.
Westin states that the landmark wiretapping case, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954), only cost the defendant $2,500 because the record did not have to be printed, the
legal fees were modest, there were no witnesses to pay and there were no exhibits to
prepare at trial. Westin, op. cit. supra at 161.
c. civil liberties cases. Westin reports that the ACLU budgets from $1,500 to $2,500 for
each case it sponsors from trial to Supreme Court; that Frank Costello spent $50,000 In
connection with the legal difficulties surrounding his naturalization; and Joseph Burstyn
spent $55,000 in a movie censorship case, Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Westin,
op. cit. supra at 161-62. Krislov states that a naturalization case, Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163 (1964), cost $6,500 even though there was no counsel fee. Krislov, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 41. The public school prayer case, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Is
estimated to have cost the ACLU $6,000. Barker & Barker, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5.
Testimony by an attorney indicated that the NAACP in Virginia spends, on the average,
$10,000 per case but that run of the mill Supreme Court cases are litigated for $2,000 or
less. Record, Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). Time magazine has reported that
NAACP Fund cases cost up to $50,000. Time, June 5, 1964, p. 66.
d. political offender cases. Westin reports that the national leadership of the Communist
Party spent $100,000 to defend a case brought by the government, and that the ACLU
spent $3,900 to fight Frank Wilkinson's conviction for contempt of Congress, Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961). Westin, op. cit. supra at 161-62. Krislov states that
the NAACP estimated that it cost well over $200,000 to get to the Supreme Court In
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); that the average cost of Supreme Court
cases testing compliance with the Brown ruling runs between $50,000 and $100,000; and
that the cost of a single trial in the district court with appeal to the court of appeals and
application to the Supreme Court runs between $15,000 and $18,000. Krislov, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 41-42. The defense of Rudolph Abel on espionage charges, Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960), incurred the following costs: printing and stenographic records,
$13,227.20; court fine, $3,000; and attorney's "token" fee, $10,000. Donovan, Strangers
on a Bridge (1964).
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parties) whose cases reach the Supreme Court are usually sponsored by or
are merely fronts for organized groups with particular axes to grind.""
This skepticism about the real adversaries seems to encourage fruitful
empirical inquires into judicial processes. However, a more careful
examination of the kinds of formal party litigants can perhaps suggest
whether or not the hypothesis is generally applicable. Some data relating
to this issue will be presented later.
More confident observations appear possible in assessing the role of
amici curiae in Supreme Court cases. Since the amicus curiae procedure is
the most visible form of group representation, its increasing use in Supreme
Court cases has been frequently noted. The historical origins and develop-
ment of this procedure have been studied by a careful scholar who has
concluded that the amicus is now an advocate rather than an interested
bystander. In the past members of the Court were concerned with the
"lobbying" aspects of amicus curiae activity but observers now agree that
even though blatant lobbying efforts have been curbed, the Supreme
Court has become more liberal in allowing participation both by brief
and by oral argument.20
Additional systematic inquiry into amici activity is still needed because
there are no empirical statistics on the manner in which the procedure
is used, or the kinds of parties who use it.21 At one time the Court was
allegedly deluged with lay briefs including many which were heavily
laden with political propaganda. Criticism of this kind of "lobbying" is
presumably moot because the preparation of and the responsibility for
these briefs is now under the exclusive control of qualified attorneys.
However, there is little analysis available for determining whether these
briefs deal with policy issues or are limited to specific legal arguments
raised by third party beneficiaries. In its more limited role, the amicus
curiae stresses legal points and factual circumstances that the principal
attorneys overlook or stress differently. It may also be assumed that the
device is used to secure representation for litigants in other pending cases.
Without such amicus representation such a litigant would, in effect, have
19. Schubert, Constitutional Politics 71 (1960), quoting Vose, supra note 6; accord,
Pritchett & Westin, op. cit. supra note 4.
20. Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief; From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L.J. 694
(1963). The first political scientist to discuss the political significance of lobbying activity
in the judicial process was probably Professor Vose. His seminal article has been included in
several anthologies and his preliminary notions about the judicial process are part of the
intellectual diet served up in most undergraduate courses in American government and
politics. Vose, supra note 6. Statistics on the incidence of amicus curiae activity are
collected in Schubert, Quantitive Analysis of Judicial Behavior 73-75 (1961).
21. See table 3, infra.
22. Krislov, supra note 20.
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his case disposed of without an opportunity for being heard. Thus, the
amicus curiae procedure, thought extremely vital in many instances, may
fall far short of the lobbying significance attributed to it in political
science literature.
More recently, Martin Shapiro and a few other political scientists
have questioned the political scientist's preoccupation with constitutional
issues. He noted that non-lawyer scholars gave considerably less emphasis
to anti-trust litigation and cases in administrative law. 8 Critics like
Marion and James Blawie note that even the combined constitutional
and administrative dockets of the Supreme Court have limited impact
on the total political-legal system. Their analysis further suggests that
most litigations are not "political" in the sense in which the word is
used here. 4
Professor Shapiro argues that constitutional preoccupation by political
scientists stunts even a realistic vision of the Supreme Court itself. Since
judges are political actors they have "the most intimate and continuous
interaction both cooperative and competitive" with other agencies of
government." However, Shapiro's view is more circumscribed than the
one taken here. Constant interaction with the government, or even conflict,
does not necessarily make behavior political. Also, the fact that judges
may decide these cases on extra-legal grounds is politically less significant
than the social context in which the decision is made. If decisions are made
with the participation of large social groups, they are more likely to be
politically significant.
Constitutional emphasis by political scientists might be justified if it
can be shown that supporters and attentive publics are more frequently
active participants in these cases. It is occasionally argued that serious
political issues involving business, labor, and agriculture have already
been settled-at least on the symbolic level 2 -- and that remaining
political battles are confined to issues like civil rights and civil liberties.
The kind of publicity these latter issues receive in the mass media and
the more visible forms of organized activity in connection with them
tend to support this widespread belief.
Contrariwise, political scientists, emendating the view of Thurman
Arnold,27 have observed that organizations make their greatest pitch
23. Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court 1-6 (1964).
24. Blawie & Blawie, The Judicial Decision: A Second Look at Certain Assumptions of
Behavioral Research, 18 Western Political Q. 579 (1965).
25. Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 23, at 4.
26. See, e.g., Galbraith, Economics and the Art of Controversy (1955).
27. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 212, 215-16 (1937). These views are developed
by Edelman, Symbols and Political Quiescence, 54 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 695, 703 (1961).
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after conflicts over symbols or ideological conflicts have been reshaped
into practical concrete issues. The absence of widespread publicity and
visibility may lead observers to ignore manifestations of political in-
fighting that the mass media overlook. In any case, the incidence of
political activity in non-constitutional cases is a matter for observation
and cannot be assumed.
II. SouRcEs AND METHODS OF INVESTIGATION
A great deal of information about parties, attorneys, amici curiae, and
arguments, are matters of public record. Until now, these records have
not been used to study these data and to challenge important assumptions
about Supreme Court litigation. One must go beyond the records, however,
to get information about litigation finance, sponsorship, cooperation,
research, coordination, planned publicity, and other litigation strategies.
The political theories herein reviewed may in fact be structured on faulty
assumptions but the observations based upon them can provide direction
for a more fruitful understanding of judicial processes than that produced
by more formal legal categories.
To "test" the propositions within the gloss of political theory, informa-
tion was gathered in 837 cases in which the Supreme Court rendered
signed or per curiam opinions. The cases, covering seven Supreme Court
terms from 1958 to 1964, were classified both in terms of their basic
subject matter and the clientele interests involved. Commercial litigations
included antitrust, public utilities, transportation, public lands, tax, labor
relations, government law suits (private property transactions), private
litigations, and private personal injury cases. Non-commercial cases
included criminal cases (involving serious anti-social crimes), civil liber-
ties cases (governmental or government supported infringements of
individual liberties), cases involving political offenders (communist and
internal security cases) and cases involving race relations. The survey
provided data about the types of formal parties, the amici curiae involved,
and in many instances the reasons given for participating as amici curiae.
For more detailed information about litigation support and strategies
in Supreme Court cases questionnaires were sent to more than 500
attorneys who participated in 127 opinion cases during the 1960-1961
Supreme Court Term.28 Many of the attorneys contributed very little to
28. Information about litigation management, however, is not confined to the sample
of cases surveyed. It is frequently difficult to tell which attorneys control a given case.
Names of attorneys or law firms making little or no contribution sometimes appear in
the appellate briefs. Attorneys who argue cases before the Supreme Court occasionally assume
control after other attorneys have borne most of the preparation burdens. This is especially
true in a situation when there is a voluminous transcript and record. The attorney of record,
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TABLE 1
PARTICIPATION AS PRINCIPALS AND AMICI CURIAE
in
SUPREME COURT LITIGATIONS
1958-1964
Commercial Cases Non-Commercial Cascs
(499 cases) (349 cases)
Type of Litigant Principal Amicus Principal Amlcus
United States Government &
Adminstrative Agencies 273 38 137 23
States, Agencies, and Their
Political Subdivisions 82 26 203 18
Private Companies and
Corporations 375 30 13 1
Trade and Business
Associations 20 69 - -
Professions - 17 - 28
Labor Unions 81 32 1 2
Social Defense
Organizations - - 13 65
Individuals 117 22 310 5
TOTAL 948 234 677 142
the survey because their participation was confined to giving general
advice or merely commenting on the legal briefs. However, a definitive
reply was received from attorneys in 78 cases. The comments that follow
are essentially the author's own interpretations derived from responses
to questionnaires, unstructured interviews, and exact tabulations."0
more frequently than not, accompanies the attorney at the time of Supreme Court oral
arguments, and participates significantly in the preparation of the briefs.
Appellate attorneys interviewed were frequently proud of their ability to "give the
record a broader perspective," but this claim was often disputed by the trial attorneys
interviewed.
In this study, "control" of a case, insofar as strategy and tactics was concerned, was
assumed to be in the bands of the law firm or attorney who answered the letter of
inquiry. Information about litigation strategy was gathered by letters as well as from
interviews. Occasionally, an attorney referred the request to another attorney "who did
most of the work," but in most cases, especially commercial cases, the responding attorney
or interviewer answered as spokesman for the law firm. While demonstrable proof Is
difficult the investigator did not feel that lack of candor or evasion affected the
validity of the responses.
29. The author has prepared more elaborate tables classifying verbalizations by
respondents and lawyers interviewed. However, the limited sample made such classifications
seem misleading. The general empirical results are replicable through generally equivalent
procedures even though precision in method is difficult to obtain in studies of this kind.
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III. THE FINDINGS
A. Formal Parties-The Role of Governments in
Supreme Court Litigation
Before commenting on activity in support of litigation, a few remarks
about the role of governments and government attorneys seem appropriate.
Although the fact is seldom stressed in the political science literature,
the United States Department of Justice and attorneys from other federal
agencies, primarily the ICC, NLRB, FPC, and FTC, participate in well
over half the cases on the Supreme Court's opinion docket. In their
prescribed supervisory roles in the Federal legal system, the Supreme
Court and administrative agencies are preoccupied with settling technical
questions in administrative law. Occasionally substantive policy issues
emerge, and the implications of these on inter-agency and Court-agency
relationships have been explored elsewhere3
In administrative law cases, especially those involving the regulatory
processes, state and local governments often appear among the formal
legal adversaries. Intergovernmental conflict is also involved in con-
stitutional cases where issues surrounding the limits of state taxation,
state regulation of labor, problems of intergovernmental tax immunity,
and national-state confrontations concerning private property transactions
(e.g., bankruptcy proceedings in which questions of national supremacy
or priority arise) are involved. Information about Court-state and other
federal relationships growing out of litigations remains largely unexplored
by political scientists.'
In its amicus curiae activity, the federal government behaves very
much like a private litigant. Most of its participation in commercial
cases is designed to promote narrow proprietary or operational interests
that would otherwise be pursued in government litigations. For example,
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice may instruct the
Court on how a statute or patent should be construed because of the
way it affects the Department's patent enforcement program. Other
regulatory agencies use the device to maximize their administrative
efficiency. State Department views are interposed in state and private
litigation to avoid embarrassing the Federal government. Sometimes
the government participates as amicus curiae to pursue even narrower
30. Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 23.
31. R. L. Stem has done some work in this field. See Stern, The Solicitor General's Office
and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46 A.B.AJ. 154 (1960); Stem, "Inconsistency" in
Government Litigation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 759 (1951). However, his work analyzing govern-
mental interests in Supreme Court litigation needs to be brought up to date and "generalized."
Much of the raw material for further inquiry lies hidden in the annual reports of the
Attorney General and the other agency solicitors. Another interesting view is stated in
Brennan, State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 Pa. B.A.Q. 393 (1960).
1966)
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
proprietary interests. In personal injury cases, for example, the govern-
ment's role as land owner, shipper, or banker comes in conflict with other
private claims.32
The participation of state and local governments in Supreme Court
cases differs from that of the federal government in the role of both
principal and amicus. When its activity is viewed in relation to other
states, each state can be observed pursuing independent interests though
degrees of cooperation among them are sometimes achieved in specific
cases. In commercial cases, for example, states having "right to work"
laws have occasionally cooperated in joining or supporting another state's
amicus brief. Similar cooperation was achieved in "off-shore oil cases,"
cases involving agricultural regulation, and in public utility cases. This
cooperation is, on very rare occasions, facilitated through the National
Association of Attorneys General, but more frequently through informal
exchanges of briefs and correspondence. 3
The Supreme Court litigation activities of political subdivisions within
states approach in complexity those of corporations and other private
business groups. Though state Attorneys General function as the equiv-
alent of "house counsel," they do not always coordinate the litigation
work of the state administrative agencies, and they have little or no control
of commercial litigation activity of the political subdivisions.
B. Other Formal Parties in Commercial Cases
Court records reveal little or nothing about litigation costs in com-
mercial cases, but a study of the formal parties involved casts doubt on
widely held views about the "representational character" of Supreme
Court cases. This doubt is further strengthened by questionnaires and
interview responses indicating that the costs in almost every commercial
case were "borne exclusively by the clients."
Self-financing is to be expected among the types of corporations or
public utilities that get involved in business regulation cases-e.g., anti-
trust, public utility, securities and exchange cases, etc. However, in cases
involving taxation, government law suits, private law suits, and personal
injury cases the client is more likely to be an individual with limited
financial resources. The breakdown of principals classified as "individuals"
in Table 2 shows that they appear as parties most frequently in com-
mercial cases involving taxation, government law suits, private law
32. Letter From Oscar H. Davis, Member of the Staff of the Solicitor General of the
United States, April 4, 1962. This author, however, assumes responsibility for characteriz-
ig a great many governmental litigation interests as "narrow" or "proprietary" (involving
ownership or property rights).
33. Letter From Mitchell Wendell, Executive Secretary, National Association of Attorneys
General, March 7, 1966.
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suits, and personal injury cases. Though the results and implications of
these cases are watched by claimant's attorneys, and attorneys from
insurance companies, banks, and specialized bar associations, none of the
participating attorneys reported any direct financial help from any of
these sources. In most of the commercial cases in which individuals, or
small business interests, participated, the stakes were sufficiently inviting
to justify clients "going all the way." Some of the attorneys noted the
availability of "contingent fee" arrangements and economies which aided
them in getting their cases to the Supreme Court as cheaply as possible. 4
Trial records in most Supreme Court cases are short with the legal or
constitutional issues clearly defined. By keeping records short, or by
having the government assume the printing costs, the expense of appellate
litigation can be made economically feasible to a broader spectrum of
social and economic interests.
The so-called big commercial cases usually involved, as party principals,
a plethora of governments, utilities, corporations, and private companies.
The complexity of the formal party interests" is usually too great to be
unravelled meaningfully. Yet a casual glance at transcripts and records
shows that interests are combined and consolidated through various
formal and informal procedures. Few of the attorneys listed in the
records participate significantly at the trial, administrative, or appellate
levels though usually all the principals involved in a litigation are at one
stage or another represented by counsel. As a matter of common practice
locally retained attorneys begin the work, and they are subsequently
joined by corporation "house counsel," and finally by "outside counsel"
brought in from the major law firms. The lawyers in the sample reported
34. The questions pertaining to financial sponsorship and support included in the ques-
tionnaires and interviews were as follows:
"Was the litigation in this case financed by your client exclusively, or was additional
financial support secured from other interested parties?"
"If the litigation was financially supported by other persons or organizations, do such
persons or organizations maintain a legal fund to defray legal expenses in test cases In
which they take an interest?"
"If the litigation was financially supported by others, apart from your client, at what
stages of the proceeding was the support given?"
Among sixty commercial litigations investigated, information was secured In only forty
cases. Attorneys in only two cases reported that they had solicited financial aid from a
national trade association. In another case an attorney reported receiving financial aid
from "another party who was a competitor and a direct beneficiary of the law suit."
Those who reported such aid gave the desire to "broaden the issues" as their reason.
35. A recent administrative proceeding involving regulation of the rates charged by
the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. involved a great many parties. "At last
count on Friday, some 27 companies, six trade associations, 23 states, 2 cities, one county
and the General Services Administration had signified their intentions of joining In the hear-
ings." N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1966, § 3, p. 1, col. 8. FCC Commissioner Lee Loevinger was re-
ported to have commented that everybody except the public was represented.
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that the preparation of briefs and other legal materials is carried on by
correspondence, conferences, and consultations. These kinds of arrange-
ments, it was noted, are familiar procedure in all kinds of litigation."
1. Private Companies and Corporations
The largest group of principals participating in commercial cases are
private companies and corporations. Even though information about the
size and wealth of these parties has not been gathered, the prominence of
many of the companies involved, and the amounts of money in controversy,
should convince anyone that cost is not a controlling factor in the planning
of most Supreme Court cases.
Attorneys in only two cases indicated that they had solicited trade
associations for financial support in behalf of their clients, and there were
only four occasions reported in which the United States Solicitor General
was asked to participate in behalf of a litigating party. Those who re-
quested such aid gave as their reasons a desire to "broaden the issues,"
"make a show of strength," or "educate the court on related aspects of
public policy." Several attorneys mentioned "the preferred status that
government attorneys deservedly enjoy" with the Supreme Court.
2. Trade and Business Associations
In political life, trade associations can be expected to represent their
members in a variety of ways. Some are in a position to control the
standards and practices of an industry or trade. Truckers, railroads,
banks, and others have associations which behave in this way. Others
like insurance underwriters, stock exchanges, industrial information
bureaus and similar agencies specialize in providing advice, information
and service to their members and other interested parties. Finally, there
is a type of association that gives the business or industrial viewpoint on a
variety of broader business issues. The Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Manufacturers seem to fit this pattern. While
these organizations on rare occasions participate as principals it is the
36. The questions pertaining to participation by "extra" attorneys were as follows:
'Vere you or your law firm the original attorney of record?"
"If not, how and when did your law firm begin to participate in the case?"
"Did you consult with other attorneys or other interests who were not parties or
participants in the litigation?"
"If so, what contribution did these persons or attorneys make toward the preparation
of the case? At what stages of the proceedings did they make their contributions?"
"Who played the most important part in pressing the litigation forward?"
Attorneys participating in 37 commercial cases responded "meaningfully" to these ques-
tions. Attorneys and law firms in 13 cases reported cooperation with other attorneys con-
sisting of conferences, exchanges of briefs, consultations, or having other attorneys read the
briefs. Some of these attorneys noted that this was common practice even though it did
not occur in the particular case about which they were reporting.
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amicus role of these groups that is of greater concern to the political
observer.
If trade associations behaved politically one would expect more amicus
curiae activity than the public records indicate. (See Table 3 inlra). The
low rate of participation is probably explained by the fact that it is
difficult to achieve consensus within an important range of an associa-
tion's clientele. A broad consensus is occasionally achieved in labor
relations "right to work" cases and other issues where an association can
unite broad segments within an industrial community. The absence of
trade association participation in most commercial cases suggests, how-
ever, that the issues are too specialized for such groups to participate
in a politically meaningful way. When an association is formed along
narrow and specialized lines, participation is more likely, but the number
of times this happens is relatively rare.
3. The Professions
If the litigation practices of trade associations do not comport with
a political view of litigation, professional groups, as indicated by their
formal or amicus activity, are even less political. These groups in fact are
barely visible. In the seven years of litigation studied they did not appear
as formal parties and they appeared as amicus curiae in only seventeen
commercial cases. Most of the appearances were occasioned by pro-
fessional bar groups or by individual lawyers seeking technical clarifica-
tion of laws governing taxes, government contracts, or specific business
regulations. To this observer it is somewhat remarkable that so few
professional groups play any role in Supreme Court cases. Accountants,
engineers, teachers, bankers, economists, and others may individually
appear as expert witnesses but rarely provide policy appraisal to guide
the Supreme Court. Apparently the issues in most commercial cases are
considered too narrow or private to encourage even that kind of participa-
tion.
4. Labor Unions
Among the various participants in Supreme Court litigation, unions have
one unique characteristic that other participating groups do not have.
A labor union "is an instrument for the collective handling of matters
relating to the employment relationship" and its existence is "made
necessary by the fact that no individual employee has the resources, the
knowledge, or the bargaining strength to settle the terms of the employ-
ment relationship in terms of equality with the employer." While the scope
of the "employment relationship" and the labor union's exclusive right to
represent the worker in many phases of this relationship is still ques-
tioned, some kind of "representative role" is usually acknowledged.87
37. Feller, Economic Groups and the Judicial Process, Paper Presented Before the
Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Sept. 6-9, 1961.
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Despite these considerations, an examination of the unions' formal and
amici appearances shows that their participation is confined almost
exclusively to representing the union as an organizational entity. An
individual worker having a grievance against the union or a "non-con-
tractual" grievance against a company will usually have to go else-
where for legal assistance. The cases involving unions concerning "unfair
labor practices" under the Labor Management Relations Act included
activities such as strikes, lockouts, illegal picketing, use of hiring halls,
and suits against unions and companies in their representational or
institutional capacities. In cases where individuals pressed grievances,
personal injury cases, or other problems, the individuals had to get their
legal support from other sources.
While international unions sometimes assume the litigation burdens of
their local affiliates, the unions as a whole generally stick to their own
knitting and rarely intervene in the litigation of others. Unions partici-
pated as amici in only 32 cases, but half of this participation was by the
house counsel of the AFL-CIO Federation. Within the labor law, and
in other business fields, there is specialization in the way amicus curiae
activity is conducted. A so-called narrow labor relations issue, such as the
specific use of a hiring hall, may bring another union into the case
because the second union has a similar litigation pending. The arguing
of broader policy issues, however, is generally left to the counsel of the
federation.
This survey of the formal side of commercial litigation suggests a
portrait of litigation activity that is quite different than the one presented
in political science literature. It suggests that Supreme Court cases are
not representational but narrowly focused private controversies. Com-
panies, individuals, unions, and others pursue narrow interests confined
to the immediate litigation. Although more than forty percent of the cases
have amici curiae of some kind, much of this activity is conducted in
pursuit of narrow private interests. If broader types of organized interests
do participate in judicial processes they are more likely to be found
"behind the scenes" supporting the formal party litigants.
C. Other Supporting Activity in Commercial Cases
To secure information about other kinds of lobbying that may be
present, attorneys were asked "whether all significant social or economic
interests" were adequately represented in the trial of their cases, and if
not, "what significant social or economic interests were not represented?" 38
38. In interviews, the following additional questions were occasionally asked:
"Do you consider your client representative of a class of people similarly situated?"
"Was any effort made to get additional representation for the people represented by
your client?"
Among those responding, only seven attorneys or law firms felt that "other interests"
were not adequately represented.
1966]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Questions were also asked about sponsorship and finance as well as other
tactics described earlier. While the purport of some of these questions
may not have been fully understood by all the attorneys, the responses
provided no support to a theory of judicial lobbying. Instead the response
verified a not unexpected ethnocentricity or "egotism" within most of the
Supreme Court's practicing bar. Attorneys participating in commercial
cases frequently volunteered the comment that their litigation was a
"straight out economic battle between the parties" or that the "impor-
tant" or "garden variety" cases involved "solely legal or financial issues."
In several instances the attorneys noted that their cases were "not a
landmark in any social or economic sense" even though the case was
"of great interest to lawyers." Many attorneys stressed the fact that
the cases concerned only the parties and were conducted without any
"behind the scenes" groups or interests.
In a number of cases attorneys representing commercial litigants were
antagonistic or even hostile to amicus curiae participation arguing that
opposing interests such as state governments, labor unions, or other
opponents had adequate opportunities to participate at earlier stages
of the proceeding. They indicated that they were opposed to persons or
groups who stand aside at the trial or administrative stages only to
appear with new arguments at the appellate level. Even where attorneys
perceived an important social impact to their cases, they noted that the
character of the parties and the amounts of money in controversy
made the litigation stand on its own bottom. In these cases, it was argued,
other interests were "too remote" from the specific issues involved.
Even in cases where smaller financial stakes were involved, the attorneys
almost always regarded their cases as private fights. A few of them
lamented the fact that policy issues were not developed at the trial or
pleading stage, and occasionally an attorney criticized lawyer colleagues
for "narrow legalistic viewpoints." Nevertheless, most responses cited
technical legal requirements, the attitudes of judges, and of opposing
counsel as justifications for strictly legalistic approaches to litigation.
A few attorneys warned that policy considerations interposed at trial
or pleading stages of litigation would make litigations unduly expensive,
introduce irrelevancies, and obscure the resolution of specific issues.
From a lawyer's point of view, litigation is a very private form of conflict,
and from all indications they expect to keep it that way.
Notwithstanding the perceptions of attorneys, it is necessary to take
note of the methodological position of behaviorists in political science
and other social disciplines. They note that an actor's appraisal of his
assertions or actions is less valuable than a consideration of those factors
influencing behavior which can be objectively observed., One kind of
39. See Professor Frank Pinner's statement regarding the "scientific" legitimacy of
making "behavioral" assumptions in Schubert, op. cit. supra note 20, at viii.
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"objective" demonstration would be a "content analysis" of attorney
verbalizations. Such an analysis might provide a deeper "psychological"
meaning to the sentiments of lawyers. In this report, however, tabulated
analyses of underlying motivation are eschewed in order to report
relevant activities accompanying the perceptions of the lawyers. Expert
testimony of economists, for example, was found to exist in only a few
antitrust, utility and business regulation cases. Accountants in two cases
gave testimony about "accrual accounting." It seems clear, however,
that these few instances are not enough to suggest that accountants or
economists articulated a cohesive group pressure in the judicial process.
Expert testimony, social science evidence, and "Brandeis briefs" are more
likely to be used in commercial litigations than in other types of cases.
Although civil libertarians and social defense groups favor their use,
they usually lack the financial and other resources necessary to develop
them. On the basis of this survey, however, I am persuaded that supporting
group activity of this kind is rarely found even in commercial cases.
Further support for a private or legalistic view of litigation is also
suggested by the observations of some attorneys that those affected by
their litigations were too poorly organized and too isolated to be helpful.
In one case an attorney, engaged in self-criticism, noted his own egotism
and his failure to solicit such help from trade and business associations.
"It might have helped," he said, "but I just didn't think of it." Thus, in
tax cases, private litigations, personal injury cases, and other instances
where concerted action may have been helpful, the attorneys gave no hint
that they availed themselves of the assistance of "behind the scenes"
interests.
Though evidence of lobbying in judicial process can be found oc-
casionally in appearances and briefs contributed by amici curiae, such
participations seem rare and, more often than not, the amicus has a
specific and separate pecuniary interest in the litigation itself. In some
of these cases, the amici are themselves parties to pending litigations.
Attorneys representing trade associations, labor unions and individual
taxpayers were among the most frequent amici but in this capacity they
were pursuing specific institutional or individual interests and not really
supporting the litigations of others.' (See Table 3). While occasionally
40. The questions pertaining to amid curiae activity were as follows:
"Did you or your client attempt to secure amicus curiae participation? Were you
successful? If so, how and why was this participation secured?"
"Did any other parties, other than the parties you sought, participate as amicus curiae?
Did you approve or disapprove of such participation? Why?"
The following questions were asked of amicus curiae participants:
"Why did your client find it necessary to participate as an amicus to the proceeding?"
"What specific contributions did your brief make to the facts and issues before the
court?"
1966]
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a policy-minded bystander would participate in a commercial case, such
participation was criticized or even ridiculed as introducing irrelevant
and confusing considerations.
If commercial litigants behaved politically, their attorneys, together
with others representing similarly situated clients, would coordinate their
activities to establish more effective litigation strategy. Multiple litigations
involving similar issues were found to occur most frequently in the
taxation and labor relations fields, and attorneys in these litigations some-
times reported that they managed more than one case at a time. However,
even if the circumstances and mutuality of interests made coordination
feasible, the situations never permitted litigants to "pick their own cases
for Supreme Court review." "Even where cases are managed," said an
experienced union attorney, "an unmanaged case gets there first."
Most attorneys reported that the case "most ripe for review" or
"most advanced in the legal mill" was the one that the Supreme Court
reviewed first. During the interviews, lawyers occasionally complained
that "the case selected turns out, from our point of view, to be the wrong
one." Counsel from international labor unions, or house counsel of large
corporations, may carefully pick their own cases-they may even
anticipate the probability of Supreme Court review-but it seems unlikely
that any attorney can ensure that a particular case will get there."
"Was any offer made to participate at earlier stages of the court proceeding? If so,
what contributions did you make?"
'Was any effort made to coordinate your participation with that of any other persons
or organizations interested in the proceedings? If so, how was this coordination achieved?"
"Did your amicus participation emphasize legal or extra-legal considerations? If extra-
legal, what was the nature of these considerations?"
In 1960 amid curiae appeared in 15 of the 60 case situations investigated. In five other
cases efforts were made to solicit amicus participation of trade associations, and in two
other cases the solicitation of the Solicitor General was reported. Attorneys in six cases
expressed opposition specifically, or in principle to the kind of amicus activity involved.
These numbers are too small to support firm conclusions, but there is little evidence
suggesting that amicus curiae plays a strategic role in commercial cases.
41. The questions pertaining to multiple litigation were as follows:
"Was your case one of several similar cases brought simultaneously in different judicial
forums?"
"If so, was coordinative effort made in carrying on the litigations?"
"If there was coordinative effort, why was this particular case selected for appeal?"
In a few cases where coordination was reported, questions like the following were asked in
interviews and questionnaire follow-ups:
"What was the nature of the coordination?"
"Did you agree to stress different issues in different cases?"
"Did you succeed in getting any litigants to drop their cases?"
"Even though your client was a defendant in a criminal case, was there an effort to
present a 'united front' or coordinate the manner in which the defenses were presented?"
Multiple litigation was reported in 14 of the 60 commercial cases studied. In none of
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Among the cases studied none were found in which attorneys and
others planned substantial public relations campaigns in connection with
a pending litigation. The usual news handouts and house organ publicity
accompanied some cases, and contact with other interested parties
followed the conventional pathways of correspondence and informal
exchange of ideas.
In summary, attorneys representing commercial litigants seem unable
or unwilling to become political actors in the judicial process. In a few
instances amici curiae, expert witnesses, or conventional legal argument
may broaden the issues involved, but most Supreme Court commercial
litigation is conducted in a purely private manner, and public consequences
apparently flow from "a series of fortuitous circumstances."
D. Non-Commercial Cases-Formal Parties and Amici
Though the distinction is not stressed in political science literature,
it may be that the "theory of the judicial lobby" is intended to apply
exclusively to non-commercial cases. In these cases, individuals represent-
ing political, cultural, religious, and social minorities are more likely to
need the financial and legal backing of others. While considerations
of this kind are sometimes pertinent, few of the cases clearly present
this situation. Business interests are often commingled with civil liberties
issues and the cases are processed in a manner similar to other private
commercial litigations. In some of these cases civil liberties organiza-
tions participate, but when they do so their activity is usually confined
to amicus curiae activity at the appellate level. Also, a large number of
Supreme Court cases classified as "non-commercial" do not involve issues
that stimulate the activity of organized civil libertarians. Thus, immigra-
tion cases, military cases, criminal cases, and others are frequently
the cases did an attorney report a successful coordinative effort to pick the right case.
In many of these cases there were exchanges of briefs and other forms of cooperation.
Both government and private attorneys in commercial cases denied any experience In
managing litigations so as to set up the right case, although several attorneys believed that
this kind of strategy was occasionally attempted. At least a dozen attorneys representing
private clients intimated that the government attorneys managed cases, and a few felt that
labor unions and trade associations were able to stage test cases "in circumstances of
their choosing." In the tax field an attorney described the situation as follows:
"In my principal field-taxation-a majority of the cases that reach the Supreme Court,
particularly on an appeal initiated by the Government, can be classified as 'managed
litigation.' A look at the percentage of opinions for certiorari granted tend to bear this
out. Frequently years will be permitted to pass, even in the face of repeated adverse
decisions by the Court of Appeals, before a case is selected to present to the Supreme Court.
• . . Many cases which should perhaps be taken up by the taxpayer do not involve
enough money to the litigant to warrant the expense. Few businessmen today can afford
to fight on 'principle.' Litigations costs are too expensive. Also the Internal Revenue
Service is notorious for stretching a Supreme Court announced principle to the utmost."
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decided on technical procedural grounds without arousing the interest
of others. Unless the litigant is affiliated with, or has some special con-
nection with an organization, he or she is unlikely to get this type of
assistance. The litigant is thus forced to finance the case himself, or
enlist the aid of friends and relatives. Finally, there are some litigants
who do not get financial or other legal support simply because they do
not ask for it.
1. Civil Liberties Cases
In a number of cases, individuals, business, and organizations of various
kinds invoke constitutional and legal principles against the actions of
public officials. Though the American Civil Liberties Union is known
for its work in this area, its spokesmen maintain that the group is not a
legal aid society, or a general social defense organization, but an organiza-
tion solely devoted to constitutional principles. As such, it sponsors only
a few cases in which constitutional issues are clearly presented.42
This organization, like other social defense groups, 3 operates with
a small legal staff and a large network of "cooperating" and consulting
attorneys. Local affiliates of the organization decide if and when to
intervene in a case, and also decide the character and the amount of legal
aid to be rendered. In the case of weaker affiliates the litigation program,
if any, is augmented by assistance from the national organization. In its
circulating memoranda and official statements emphasis is placed upon
the organization's policy of referring prospective litigants to "cooperating
attorneys" who control the cases under organization sponsorship. Even
if the organization chooses not to sponsor a given case, an attorney recom-
mended by the ACLU may decide to press the litigation forward unilater-
ally.4
4
Though cooperating attorneys participate in an increasing number
of cases, there are many more cases involving civil liberties issues in which
the organizations do not participate. Even including those in which they
participate as amici, the activity of organizations is visible in only one-
third of the civil liberties cases.
42. Watts, The Role of the American Civil Liberties Union-In the Courts and
Thereafter, Paper Presented Before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Sept. 6-9, 1961.
43. "A Social Defense" organization is sometimes distinguished from a constitutional
defense organization on the grounds that it defends a special group of persons rather
than general constitutional principles. Ginger, Special Purpose Defense Organizations, 1939
Law Guild Rev. 141.
44. Watts, supra note 42. Among 11 of the 20 "Civil Liberties" cases in 1961, one
was jointly sponsored by the ACLU and the American Jewish Congress. and one case
was sponsored by the Planned Parenthood Federation. In two other cases, attorneys
"suspected" that the cases were instigated by "negligence lawyers" and "publishers."
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2. Political Offender Cases
Another somewhat different pattern of activity is found in cases
involving political offenders. In these cases-especially those involving
Communists or "fellow travelers"-litigations are handled by a small
and decreasing number of attorneys associated with or cooperating with
ad hoc defense committees, or small radical defense organizations.40
Those cases are occasionally supported by civil liberties foundations,"
and the lawyers retained are frequently associated with the National
Lawyers Guild.4 7
Government sources reported that cases of this kind were "well sup-
ported and financed." However, Milner Alexander's study of the "Right
to Counsel for the Politically Unpopular" indicated that many liberal
lawyers-especially during the height of the McCarthy era-refused
to handle cases for fear of economic and political reprisals. Other lawyers,
she found, refused to defend these clients because they disliked them,
disapproved of their ideas, or because they allegedly did not follow the
advice of their attorneys. Alexander received responses from other "con-
servative" attorneys who believed that political offenders were egotists
who were not interested in court cases as law cases but as vehicles of
propaganda.48
45. Alexander, The Right to Counsel for the Politically Unpopular, 22 Law in Transition
19 (1962).
46. According to Ann Fagin Ginger, editor of Civil Liberties Docket, "Of the 270,000
attorneys in the United States today [Martindale-Hubbell as of 1964 estimates the total
as close to 300,000] fewer than 1,000 represented either a plaintiff or defendant in
constitutional litigations. Also, less than half that number instituted even one action for
a plaintiff seeking vindication of 'constitutional' rights. In fact, fifty law firms handled
the bulk of the 2,600 cases. These fifty firms included those specializing in constitutional
litigation and general staff counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Emergency Civil
Liberties Committee, the Committee to Assist Southern Lawyers of the National Lawyers
Guild, and the Commission on Law and Social Action of American Jewish Congress."
Ginger, supra note 6, at 464.
If the list were confined to those who handle the trial of political offenders it would
undoubtedly be considerably smaller.
47. See, e.g., Bill of Rights Fund, A Five Year Summary of Grants, 1954-1959 (1959).
Grants were given by this organization to principals involved in Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S.
1 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72 (1959). Apparently, money was also provided by other social defense groups. In order
to receive assistance from these groups, the case has to be a "cause celebre" which lends
itself to fund raising. Social defense organizations rarely assume control of a case or
provide funds merely because the individual lacks resources or happens to be Indigent,
See National Lawyers Guild, Civil Rights and Liberties Handbook-Pleadings and Practice
(1963); Ginger, supra note 43.
48. Alexander, supra note 45.
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Many of the attorneys who remain available to handle political of-
fender cases are older labor lawyers who received their "baptism of fire"
in the days of the New Deal and prior to that era, when labor leaders,
socialists, and radicals required legal defense on account of their labor
union activities. The National Lawyers Guild is the professional legal
offspring of the New Deal period and these lawyers have retained member-
ship in this small segment of the bar despite governmental and private
sanctions directed against them. 9
During the period covered by this study there were several cases in
which Communists, the Communist Party, Communist-front organiza-
tions, and other similar groups were still under attack. A few law firms
have become highly specialized in this type of litigation, but the "more
respectable" ACLU lawyers seldom participate as the principal attorneys.
Although the leftist attorneys seek the cooperation and support of the
American Civil Liberties Union in the conduct of their cases, this support
is rarely made available at the trial level.
While cooperation between leftist attorneys and ACLU staff or "co-
operating" attorneys takes place, there appears to be an ideological
chasm which divides them in the conduct of their litigation work. Leftists
sometimes criticize the ACLU for not making a "principled" defense in
certain cases, but individuals rejected or abandoned by the ACLU are
sometimes able to get attorneys from other organizations, the Emergency
Civil Liberties Committee, for example. These and similar lawyers who
handle political offender cases usually differ from ACLU lawyers, not
only in their degree of commitment to the clients they represent, but also
in their litigation strategy and tactics.5°
The most common political offender cases involve naturalization and
deportation proceedings, non-communist affidavit cases, employment
security (loyalty), passports and travel, registration or membership
49. The National Lawyers Guild, a small professional bar association, was under
continuous attack during the 1950's by the United States Department of Justice and
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In 1954, the district court held that
the Guild was entitled to an administrative bearing. In 1958, after prolonged litigation,
the government's attempt to list the Guild as a Communist front organization was
dropped, but the House Committee on Un-American Activities has continued the
harassment. House Comm. on Un-American Activities, Communist Legal Subversion--The
Role of the Communist Lawyer, H.R. Rep. No. 41, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1959).
50. Lamont, Freedom Is As Freedom Does (1956); House Comm. on Un-American
Activities, supra note 49. The fear of "guilt by association," at least in the past, reduced
the cooperation between attorneys in left-wing social defense organizations and attorneys
cooperating with the American Civil Liberties Union. Critics of the ACLU claim that
it has gone far beyond the necessary disclaimers in attempting to disassociate itself from
the pro-Communist stigma. While left-wing attorneys do not volunteer this information
such an impression is gained after the topic is introduced into the conversation. "Left
wing" attorneys claim they take a more "principled" position in defense of civil liberties.
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in the Communist Party or front organizations, contempt charges in
congressional investigations, and civil disabilities imposed on Communists
and other political dissenters. The ACLU sometimes sponsors cases of
this kind but only if the constitutional issue is the dominant issue in the
litigation.
3. Race Relations Cases
After more than a decade and a half of harassment in the southern
states, the NAACP and its Legal Defense and Education Fund legal staff
have established constitutional legitimacy for the main lines of its "repre-
sentational" litigation activity. In a line of cases culminating in NAACP v.
Button,5' the Supreme Court majority's dicta have sanctioned at least
some forms of litigation sponsorship and management. Nevertheless, a
cloud of suspicion still surrounds the manner in which these lawyers
secure clients, and the degree of influence clients retain over litigations
when they are once begun. Justice Harlan and others have expressed
doubts about whether the NAACP and its clients are in agreement at
different stages of the litigation process. As Justice Harlan suggested in
his dissenting opinion 5 2 some clients may want to go all the way and
are willing to accept Pyrrhic victories while others may choose to coexist
rather than do battle in court.5 3 Though Harlan's standards may over-
state the normal incidents of an attorney-client relationship, these tradi-
tional beliefs among lawyers and others are likely to die hard.
At the present time the NAACP staffs and their "cooperating" attorneys
control most of the race relations cases that reach the Supreme Court.
Questions surrounding legal tactics may, however, become moot due to the
surge of litigation connected with more recent race relations activity.
Picketing, demonstrations, sit-ins, and other forms of protest have
substantially changed the litigation picture. 4 The NAACP lawyers are
no longer alone in defense of the movement for racial reform.55 Their
tactical approaches once characterized as "radical" by some or "slow" by
51. 371 U.S. 415 (1962). Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion discusses the NAACP's
"representational" activities in detail but he did not feel that the majority's characterization
of such litigation activity as "political expression," id. at 429-31, precluded state regulation.
Id. at 453.
52. Id. at 462.
53. See Murphy & Pritchett, op. cit. supra note 10, at 231; Murphy, The South
Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 Western Political Q. 371 (1959).
54. Time magazine reported that the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
during the year 1963, defended 10,487 civil rights demonstrators, fought 168 separate
groups of legal actions in 15 states and pushed 30 cases up to the Supreme Court. Time, June
5, 1964, p. 66.
55. For an appraisal by political scientists, see Birkby & Murphy, Interest Group
Conflict in the Judicial Arena: The First Amendment and Group Access to the Courts,
42 Texas L. Rev. 1018, 1039 (1964).
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others now compete with those being developed by attorneys representing
the National Lawyers Guild, the American Bar Association, and the
American Civil Liberties Union. It is not yet possible to evaluate the
behavior of each of these groups of lawyers, but preliminary indications
are that each set of attorneys operates more or less at arms length from
the other. The ABA-sponsored attorneys operate in the tradition of
legal aid societies and "of counsel" to overtaxed trial attorneys in race
cases. While occasionally cooperating with the Committee to Aid Southern
Lawyers of the National Lawyers Guild, it is almost certain that this
kind of volunteer did not enlist to "defend the movement" or to "avoid
tactics of individualized defense and litigation which will wind up in the
Supreme Court three years from now." Lawyer spokesmen from the
National Lawyers Guild speak the language of collective militancy
though their actual legal practices may reflect more attention to conven-
tional lawyer-client procedures. 6 Finally, if past behavior is precedent,
lawyers representing the American Civil Liberties Union and affiliated
groups will avoid direct identification with the Negro protest by sup-
porting and seeking out selected constitutional cases for ultimate Supreme
Court test.
4. Criminal Cases
A separate pattern of lawyer activity involving an essentially separate
set of attorneys is observable in the case histories of criminal litigations
which reach the Supreme Court. The largest number of cases result from
prisoner applications and cases brought forward by public defenders
or court appointed attorneys." Most of the attorneys in these criminal
56. See, e.g., Kopkind, New Radicals in Dixie: Those "Subversive" Civil Rights Workers,
New Republic, April 10, 1965, p. 13; Letter From Dean Jefferson Fordham to the New
York Times, May 12, 1965, p. 46, col. 6; Letter From Arthur Kinoy and William M.
Kunstler to the New York Times, May 17, 1965, p. 34, col. S.
According to a report by the Supreme Court correspondent of the New York Times,
the Mississippi Bar Association "welcomed" participation by volunteers from the American
Bar Association's Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. John C. Satterfield,
former president of the American Bar Association, was quoted as saying that "there is a
great difference in representing individuals in unpopular causes and representing paid
agitators who have been sent to Mississippi to get arrested and are assured that their
legal fees will be paid." N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1965, p. 1, col. 2. Mississippi lawyers
refused to defend those individuals because it would amount to representing the organizations
themselves.
Another volunteer group, organized under the auspices of or in cooperation with the
ACLU, was known as the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee. A third group
known as the Lawyers Committee to Aid Southern Lawyers was associated with the
National Lawyers Guild was the first of these groups to be organized.
57. Information about litigation sponsorship or support was available in 20 of 28
Supreme Court "Criminal" cases (cases involving serious crimes against persons or
society-robbery, narcotics, murder) decided in 1961. Court appointed attorneys, in pro-
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cases had no connection with the American Civil Liberties Union or
similar groups, and according to their responses, they did not request aid
from that organization or any similar group. Other criminal lawyers were
financed exclusively by their clients and litigated their cases in the manner
that private law practice would dictate.B The patterns of activities
described provide some degree of regularity in the Supreme Court Bar's
non-commercial cases. These patterns are unlikely to be changed by
subsequent events. The Vietnam protest, combined with the emergence
of the "New Left," undoubtedly will produce new legislation and new
litigation tests. It seems unlikely, however, that fundamental changes
in legal representation are likely to occur. As radical protests are isolated,
the defense of the participants will be assumed by those traditionally
defending leftists though the ranks of these attorneys will probably
increase.
Any taxonomy of litigation routes to the Supreme Court cannot, of
course, overlook the conventional and sometimes idiosyncratic paths
that some cases take. As already noted, cases classified as "non-com-
mercial," particularly those involving civil liberties, turn out in some
cases to be pocketbook actions with constitutional by-products. In other
instances determined individuals press their own principles against
organizational advice and at high cost to themselves. Finally, lawyers
take cases for sport, and the prestige of arguing before the highest
tribunal. Attorneys in all kinds of cases often state that their case was
their fight in which they alone had to carry the major burden.
E. Supporting Activity in Non-Commercial Cases
One would expect that a different breed of attorney inhabits the world
of non-commercial Supreme Court litigations. This belief is only partially
justified because most of the non-commercial litigations involve private
complaints about the use of public authority. Most of the cases that
reach the Supreme Court involve the troubles of public servants, lawyers,
home owners, soldiers, union officials, civilians in military posts, and a
variety of other persons complaining about official actions. Though the
cases are considered "important" enough for Supreme Court review,
they ordinarily do not qualify for support by organized civil libertarians.
ceedings in forma pauperis, were reported in 12 cases. A "cooperating" ACLU attorney
managed one case. Two cases were litigated by public defenders, One was supported "by
friends and ad hoc committees," and four cases were reportd to have been financed ex-
clusively by the clients. See note 34 supra.
Legal aid and defender organizations are primarily concerned with making legal
services available to specific individuals. Their concern is not with the shaping of the
criminal law by lobbying litigation issues. See generally, Jacob, Justice in America (1965);
Schmidhauser, Constitutional Law in the Political Process (1963).
58. Ibid.
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In any event, the parties in civil liberties cases usually secure their own
attorneys without soliciting or receiving help from any outside source.
Only a few lawyers handling civil liberties cases see their cases as
representing the interests of large classes of citizens.
In civil liberties cases involving movie censorship and church-state re-
lationships, the litigation was primarily commercial with constitutional
overtones. Though many cases were brought "simultaneously," local cen-
sorship statutes differed in detail and any important degree of coordination
was not feasible. Also, litigation enthusiasm varied with different com-
mercial litigants who brought cases of this kind. 9
Even where mutuality of interests overcomes specific circumstances,
attorneys differ in the way social defense litigation should be conducted.
In 1961, a prominent attorney in the American Civil Liberties Union
proposed that the organization's "cooperating" attorneys coordinate all
contempt of Congress litigations in which a first amendment defense
was raised. The proposal was rejected because of the organization's con-
tinuing policy of confining intervention to those cases "where the issues
are exclusively and predominately those of civil liberties." Participation
in all similar cases, it was argued, would drain the organization's resources
by getting it involved in cases clouded by evidentiary considerations. Since
ACLU attorneys consider the organization a constitutional rather than a
general defense organization, defendants with weak constitutional cases
would have to get help elsewhere or fight their own legal battles. Attorneys
in particular civil liberties cases cited examples where attorneys agreed to
59. In The Sunday Closing Cases, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US. 599 (1961); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
business firms or businessmen were the "formal parties in interest" though religious
interests were deeply involved and appeared at the trial stage of litigation. Attorneys
representing some of the respondents in these cases indicated that they consulted with
attorneys of the American Jewish Congress, but noted that the litigations were brought
separately and involved no comprehensive coordination even on the part of the religious
interests involved. The American Jewish Congress Committee and the American Jewish
Congress appeared as amicus curiae at the Supreme Court level. An attorney in one of
these organizations reported that he first learned of the case in U.S. Law Week, and
decided that it was the kind of case in which his group was interested. He tried to enlist
many other Protestant church and lay organizations to "go along with his brief."
Reasons given by these other organizational spokesmen for refusing to cooperate reflect
the difficulties in securing cooperation even in the signing of a brief. For example, leaders
indicated that they would have to "consult their organizations," or "take a vote." Others
reported that there was not enough time to achieve consensus within the organization.
For another report of The Sunday Closing Cases, see Lund, The Sunday Closing Cases, in
Pritchett & Westin, The Third Branch of Government-8 Cases in Constitutional Polities
275 (1963). Though movie censorship cases in 1961 were brought "simultaneously" in
different judicial forums, there was no reported evidence of any conscious coordination.
Attorneys indicated that the interests involved were too unique to invite such coordination.
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focus particular issues in certain ways, but even in these cases, the facts
and circumstances of the individuals concerned were controlling con-
siderations.
In race relations and political offender cases the opportunities for con-
trol are at least more favorable. As already noted, political offenders al-
ways have had few available attorneys to appeal these types of cases. In
the last seven Supreme Court terms the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund, Inc., controlled about two-thirds of the race relations
cases, and three law firms managed more than 40 percent of the political
offender cases that reached the Supreme Court. This legal monopoly, at
least in principle, gives these attorneys a strategic role in channeling cases
upward.
Lawyers in non-commercial cases also disagree on the use of publicity
in pending cases. Some attorneys argue that the Supreme Court does not
decide cases on strictly legal grounds, and publicity, when discreetly used,
serves as an educational vehicle. Others point out that publicity is essential
to counteract unfavorable public opinion, stimulated by government, in
cases involving politically or even socially unpopular defendants. The
leading organizations do not use this tactic in order to get financial sup-
port as money is available in their general funds. They confine their
publicity in pending cases to house organs and standard news handouts.
General publicity in pending cases is carefully avoided."0
Though opinions differ on other techniques, there is widespread agree-
ment among non-tommercial lawyers on the value of amicus curiae briefs.
In non-commercial cases other social defense organizations are occasion-
ally represented, but the ACLU is far and away the most active organiza-
tion. From 1958 to 1964 it participated in 20 civil liberties cases, 12
criminal cases, 11 political offender cases and 3 cases involving race rela-
tions. The distribution of amici activity is shown in Table 2.
60. The questions asked pertaining to the use of publicity in litigation were as follows:
"Did you or your client do anything to publicize the issues involved in this case? If so,
was publicity conducted while the case was pending? If not, when?"
In subsequent interviews, the following question was included:
"How do you feel about publicity in pending Supreme Court litigation?"
Only seven commercial cases had elements of publicity connected therewith, but the
publicity was passive and apparently not a part of litigation strategy. In one Instance
where the issue in litigation involved public relations, the public relations firm reported
that the matter was taken out of its hands and "placed exclusively in the hands of
attorneys." A midwestern attorney in another case involving bankruptcy "suspected that
the government chooses midwestern cases because midwestern lawyers do not generally
solicit publicity." Some attorneys in important public utility cases voiced the opinion that
most Supreme Court cases bring with them "a retinue of lawyers, experts, and a public
relations counsel and even the nudging of senators and representatives." In most of the
interviews conducted, this view was not volunteered-even though several attorneys
granted its plausibility.
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As one would expect, the forces at work in criminal cases are markedly
different than those involved in civil liberties, political offender and race
relations cases. Criminal cases are almost never regarded as "representa-
tive" proceedings in any sense. The ACLU over the past seven years has
participated in only a dozen criminal cases which resulted in Supreme
Court opinions. Attorneys handling criminal cases often regard themselves
as "lone wolves" and "independent operators" who feel they are "perfectly
capable" of handling their own cases. Some of the attorneys indicated
that they were opposed to seeking or getting outside help, and in two
interviews the attorneys complained that the "ACLU was trying to take
my case away." While some criminal cases involved notorious clients
and presumably large fees, a much larger number of cases involved at-
torneys who had "assumed a lonely burden of fighting a cause without
pay and without help from any source."
IV. CONCLUSION
While this is essentially one man's portrait, the impression gained
after long investigation is that the picture of Supreme Court litigation is
at odds with that usually presented in political science literature. The
actual judicial process appears to be a close approximation of the tradi-
tional legal model in which judicial policy-making emerges through ad hoc
private controversies. The parties, attorneys, and issues in Supreme Court
cases, more often than not, remain narrowly private so as to prevent
irrelevancies and outside pressure.
The notion that the judicial process is part of a continuing political
process is one that needs serious qualification and refinement. In each
Supreme Court term many cases involve merely technical interlocutory
issues and "leave other factual or legal issues open." Though litigations
are occasionally followed by remedial legislative changes their connection
to the political scene must be found elsewhere than through their particu-
lar attorneys, clients and active litigation supporters. Though the formal
and informal channels of access are difficult to analyze, the available evi-
dence does not support a theory of judicial lobbying or planned litigation.
The immediate result of Supreme Court litigation, or any other litiga-
tion, is, of course, the disposition of the immediate case only. The holding
may, however, be far reaching and of great interest to others. In this way
the "law" results from legal action, but the action, at least in point of time,
is not a representative proceeding. As noted earlier, political scientists
reject this view, sometimes on the ground that the lawsuit is really
"symbolic" of a larger interest conflict"' or at other times because the
Supreme Court is itself a "clientele group" of specific interests engaged in
61. This view is reflected in Beth, Politics, the Constitution and the Supreme Court
(1962) ; see authorities cited note 6 supra.
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political struggle. Some would argue, for example, that the present Su-
preme Court is really a clientele group for the NAACP, civil libertarians,
or other groups whose viewpoint frequently prevails in the Court's judicial
decisions.
The first view is a disguised restatement of legal doctrine, but the
clientele view implies that groups of people, directly or indirectly, push
litigation forward. This group pressure view is shared by many political
scientists but they seldom provide even rudimentary clues regarding its
verification. How do these broader interests get represented? Is it through
the attorneys? Or by way of the described lobbying techniques?
If "lobbying" of litigation were to become widespread as "a form of
political or pressure group activity," a fundamental change in thinking
about judicial process would be necessary. Businessmen, companies,
unions and corporations would have to abandon traditional attorney-client
relationships and interpose trade associations and labor federations be-
tween themselves and their attorneys. In social and political litigations,
"social defense" or defense by civil liberties organizations would have to
supersede the limited functions performed by legal aid and public de-
fender groups, and members of the organized bar would have to abandon
traditional notions about the "independence of the bar" and "attorney-
client relationships and privileges" in order to recognize their collective
group responsibility for the making of public policy. The individual who
seeks to vindicate his private rights in the Supreme Court would have to
recognize that the judicial process is no place for idiosyncratic notions
of public policy.
The evidence suggests, however, that neither the legalistic world of
individual attorney-client relationships nor a world of organized or
"managed" litigations reflects the actualities of Supreme Court litigation
processes.
Almost all lower court litigations raise important issues of law and
policy but few attract the participation of outside groups because the
principles involved are too closely intermingled with the private interests
of the litigants. As we move from the lower to the higher courts, we find
that most of the judicial work has a narrower scope and that it is carried
forward, beyond the trial stage, only insofar as the litigant is able to pay
for it. Most of the issues that receive judicial attention in appellate court
opinions are those involving technical legal matters. These issues are often
interlocutory in nature, and are usually confined to the clarification of
legal tasks.
The private parties involved in Supreme Court cases usually represent
individual, commercial, proprietary or pecuniary interests. The "real party
in interest" in these cases is the same as the formal party, and there are
usually no "behind the scenes" groups intervening between the attorney
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and his business client. Sponsorship of such litigation by persons other
than the formal parties is rare, but it occurs most frequently in cases in-
volving political offenders or racial discrimination.
The lawyer's role in influencing governmental policymaking is even
more apparent in the judicial sphere than in connection with lobbying in
the legislative and administrative processes. Large bureaucratically so-
phisticated commercial law firms are particularly sensitive to the possibili-
ties of raising new issues, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, and
they have the ability to bring to bear resources such as money, files, or-
ganization, and expertise, in order to respond quickly and sensitively
before significant judicial decisions are made.
Criminal defense attorneys prefer to work alone and to insulate the
case within the narrow confines of their client's private interests. Social
defense organizations, on the other hand, participate in support of litigants
whose cases provide "public relations" or "educational value." In cases
involving the politically unpopular, these attributes provide the basis for
the raising of funds for legal expenses and attorney's fees. Civil liberties
organizations, and most private organizations supporting civil liberties
causes, do not usually intervene at the trial level unless the issues are
clearly focused and disentangled from other legal and evidentiary con-
siderations.
Though coordination or management of multiple litigations is theo-
retically possible, there are too many intervening variables to prevent its
success. Litigation management involves problems of timing, the choice
of a litigant, selection of judicial forum, the strategic choice of pleadings,
and the cooperation of the attorneys. Despite these obstacles, coordination
is sometimes attempted. Lawyers exchange briefs and extend courtesies,
but unless there is a common client, there is likely to be very little plan-
ning or coordination even among litigants who are similarly situated.
Participation in the role of amicus curiae is generally aimed at further-
ing independent pecuniary or proprietary interests, but, in commercial
cases, there is evidence that the participation of the United States govern-
ment is sought to strengthen the legal position of the formal party. In
social and political litigations, the ACLU plays an amicus role similar to,
but less effective than, the role assumed by the United States government
in commercial cases. Other amici in social and political litigations partici-
pate primarily as advocates on behalf of the general position advanced
by the party litigant. Some coordination of amicus curiae activity among
private groups is achieved through clearance procedures which include
conferences and exchanges of information and briefs. In social and
political cases a great deal of effort is expended in enlisting endorsements
to "strengthen" a litigant's position and in avoiding duplicative and un-
necessary "me too" briefs. In the last analysis, however, amicus curiae
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briefs reflect the independent work products of individual attorneys or
law firms.
On the basis of this study, organized interest groups would appear to
play a relatively minor role in Supreme Court decision-making. The
political role which the courts play in adjusting private disputes to changes
in social and economic policy is played in an atmosphere fundamentally
insulated from the "principled" arguments, evidence and lobbying pressure
that social and commercial organizations bring to bear on the judicial
process.
